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  During the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 
2001, the disagreements between Western Europe and the United States over the death penalty have 
become ever more pronounced.  Despite the declaration of a “war” on terrorism by the United States, 
[FN1] a number of European countries have announced that they will not extradite alleged terrorists if 
the suspects are threatened by a death sentence. [FN2]  In addition, they will not provide specific 
intelligence information on defendants charged with the death penalty. [FN3] 
 
  In the long run these events may prove decisive for the future development of the death penalty in the 
United States.  In recent years, the United States has come under growing pressure, if not attack, by its 
European allies over its use of the death penalty.  In various fora--domestic, regional and international-- 
Europeans have taken issue with the notion that death can ever be an appropriate sentence and with the 
actual or threatened imposition of *132 capital punishment in individual cases. [FN4] 
 
  This Article provides a short historical overview of the death penalty abolitionist movement 
(“abolitionist movement”) in various European states, and highlights how after largely parallel paths, 
during the 1970s Europe and the United States parted ways.  Next it discusses the various ways in which 
individual European states, the European human rights machinery and the European Union (EU) have 
indicated their disagreement and disenchantment with the United States over the issue of the death 
penalty.  Like segregation, the death penalty increasingly causes international problems for the United 
States.  It allows countries to charge the United States with human rights violations, isolates the United 
States from European states, and symbolizes the American determination to interpret human rights so as 
to accord with the U.S. Constitution and public opinion, rather than internationally recognized 
principles.  While most Americans remain unaware of the embarrassment the imposition of the death 
penalty--especially when employed against juveniles and the mentally challenged--causes its diplomats 
abroad and in international fora, the U.S. fight against terrorism will increasingly highlight the problems 
the imposition of the death penalty constitutes in creating an international coalition and providing for 
effective cross-border cooperation.  Publicity of Europe’s opposition and refusal to cooperate in death 
penalty cases arising from the “War Against Terrorism” might provide the necessary impetus to move 
domestic institutions to restrict, and ultimately abolish, the death penalty, despite popular support for it. 
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  The modern abolitionist movement traces its origins to Italy’s criminologist Cesare Beccaria, who 
argued for the abolition of the death penalty as inhumane in the late eighteenth century. [FN5]  *133 
Over the next few decades, the abolitionist movement took hold [FN6] even though the modern history 
of the death penalty in Europe is as varied as in the individual states making up the United States.  While 
a few European states abolished capital punishment in the nineteenth century, [FN7] most did not take 
this step until the second half of the twentieth century. [FN8]  Certain groups of individuals- juveniles 
and pregnant women-however, came to be exempted from execution much earlier. [FN9]  In addition, 
the number of death-eligible offenses declined during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in all 
European countries. [FN10]  The time in which no execution occurred also lengthened in numerous 
European countries.  This was particularly important since de jure abolition often lagged behind de facto 
abolition. [FN11]  However, newly emerging criminological theories and fascist regimes reversed the 
abolitionist trend in Europe which existed prior to World War I. [FN12] 
 
  During World War II, the number of executions surged on all sides, often after long execution-free 
periods.  In its aftermath, the Nuremberg trials led to the hanging of numerous individuals implicated in 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. [FN13]  War criminals were also executed following domestic 
prosecutions in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. [FN14] 
 
  After this dramatic upsurge in executions, further imposition of the death penalty declined 
substantially.  Over popular opinion, *134 Germany, in its Basic Law of 1949, abolished capital 
punishment. [FN15]  While an abolitionist attitude developed in some European states in the 1950s, in 
others this did not occur until the late 1960s and 1970s.  Even though some European countries 
continued executions throughout the 1950s and 1960s, by the end of that decade, most of them stopped 
executions de facto. [FN16]  By 1970, five European countries--Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland-- were de facto, but not yet de jure, abolitionist.  While the population in most 
European countries continued to support the death penalty throughout these decades, [FN17] the 
political elites argued for, and ultimately accomplished, first a de facto and finally a de jure ban on 
executions. [FN18]  It was not until the last decade of the twentieth century that the majority of the 
population in at least some European countries became abolitionist. [FN19] 
 
  The development in the United States during much of this time runs largely parallel to the events in 
Europe.  The Michigan Territory abolished the death penalty, with the exception of punishment for 
treason, in 1846. [FN20]  By 1929, sixteen states had abolished capital punishment, [FN21] with many 
of them acting during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. [FN22]  Between the two world 
wars, however, the death penalty experienced a short resurgence. [FN23]  Nevertheless, by the 1960s it 
had become increasingly *135 a regional phenomenon, primarily focused on the southern states. [FN24] 
 
  Even states that permitted capital punishment, however, grew ever more reluctant to execute.  In 1966, 
only one person was executed; in 1968 and 1969, no executions occurred. [FN25]  With the Supreme 
Court’s de facto moratorium imposed in Furman v. Georgia, [FN26] it appeared at the time as if the 
abolitionist development would take the same course in the United States as in Europe.  Because of the 
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small number of executions annually during the late 1960s, a judicially-imposed moratorium appeared to 
foreshadow the ultimate demise of capital punishment. [FN27]  While this held true for European 
countries, it did not for the United States. [FN28] 
 
 
B. Parting Ways 
 
  Opposition to the Supreme Court’s Furman decision developed immediately, and the state legislatures 
whose statutes had been invalidated began to draw up new punishment regimes that would allow for the 
imposition of the death penalty under the Furman framework. [FN29]  With the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, [FN30] which declared the revised state death penalty statutes 
constitutional, executions in the United States resumed; and the death row population has increased 
dramatically since the late 1970s. [FN31] 
 
  *136 During the late 1980s and the 1990s, an increasing number of states, including some that had long 
been abolitionist de jure, reinstituted the death penalty. [FN32]  Moreover, congressional legislation 
reinvigorated the federal death penalty starting in the late 1980s, and substantially expanded its reach 
with the 1994 Federal Death Penalty Act. [FN33]  The first federal execution in almost forty years 
occurred in the summer of 2001, when Timothy McVeigh was sent to death for his involvement in the 
Oklahoma City bombing. [FN34]  Even though federal death row is very small, compared to the number 
of individuals awaiting execution by the states, [FN35] its existence carries substantial symbolic 
meaning. 
 
  As of 2002, about 3700 individuals are on death row, with 540 having been executed between 1991 
and 2000. [FN36]  A number of them are citizens of Spain, England, Germany, France, and other 
European countries. [FN37] 
 
  The divergence in attitudes and practices between the United States and European countries that began 
in the early to mid-1970s parallels developments in a host of other criminal justice areas, including the 
imposition of incarcerative sentences and collateral sanctions. [FN38]  While the United States 
expanded its use of the death penalty starting in the late 1970s, shortly thereafter the European countries 
began to institutionalize abolition of the death penalty.  The European Convention on Human Rights, 
*137 which entered into force in 1953, [FN39] still allows for capital punishment as an exception to the 
right to life, [FN40] but the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention-opened for signature in 1983-
captures the abolitionist spirit. [FN41] The Protocol outlaws death sentences generally, but narrowly 
allows countries to retain capital punishment “in time of war or imminent threat of war.”[FN42]  In that 
situation, executions become analogized to the killing of enemy soldiers on the battlefield, while there 
seems little connection to the execution of offenders in the criminal arena.  The exception can therefore 
be explained by the fact that capital sentences in war are viewed as part of the war effort rather than as a 
tool of the criminal justice process. [FN43]  Capital punishment in times of war is tied more closely to 
the existence and survival of the state and state sovereignty than in times of peace. 
 
  Since the Sixth Protocol has been opened for ratification, states applying for membership to the 
Council of Europe have been expected to sign it prior to admission. [FN44]  While those countries that 
were already member-states of the Council of Europe were not under the same pressure, [FN45] no 
executions have occurred in those states. [FN46] 
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  Turkey’s imposition of the death penalty on Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish independence 
movement and convicted terrorist, has caused widespread public and diplomatic protest in *138 the 
other Council of Europe member-states. [FN47]  Because of their extensive diplomatic threats against 
Turkey, it complied with the stay of execution issued while Öcalan’s case is being heard before the 
European Court of Human Rights, and agreed to lift the death penalty even for terrorism crimes. [FN48]  
The European response to the Öcalan case is indicative of the pressure the member-states of the Council 
of Europe and the European Union have exerted on other member-states and applicant states with regard 
to the death penalty. [FN49] 
 
  In February 2002, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe took the final step on the road 
to abolition.  It signed the Thirteenth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
completes the mission of the Sixth Protocol by abolishing the death penalty even in times of war and 
serious national emergencies. [FN50]  This development, following on the heels of the U.S. 
administration’s declaration of a “war on terrorism,” indicates how serious the Council member states 
are about abolishing the death penalty entirely.  Even though popular support for the death penalty may 
continue in many European countries, the present regional legal regime makes it impossible for Council 
of Europe member-states to re-introduce the death penalty without violating the European Convention 
and its *139 Protocols. [FN51] 
 
  The death penalty has become a growing issue of contention between Europe and the United States.  
Among the leading and most vocal countries opposing capital punishment are the former fascist nations 
of Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. [FN52]  In recent years, they have developed a panoply 
of responses to U.S. executions. 
 
  II European Pressure 
 
  In recent years, European countries--acting individually and in a wide variety of domestic, regional, 
and international fora--have strongly criticized the United States on its use of the death penalty.  They 
have attempted to exert pressure in individual death cases and have publicly embarrassed the United 
States. [FN53] 
 
  While the United States is not the only target of European pressure, [FN54] because of its international 
stature, its use of the death penalty has attracted particular censure.  For Europeans to *140 succeed in 
their ultimate goal of a world-wide ban on capital punishment, they will need U.S. support. [FN55] 
 
 
A. Actions within International and Regional Human Rights Bodies 
 
  The European countries have taken a variety of measures within the European Union and the Council 
of Europe to prevent continued imposition of the death penalty in the United States.  Among their 
actions are a powerful information campaign against the death penalty, the financing of amicus briefs in 
U.S. courts, and relentless diplomatic efforts. [FN56] 
 
  There appears to be universal agreement that pregnant women and mothers of very young children 
should not be executed [FN57] and that the death penalty should be imposed only for the most serious 
offenses. [FN58]  The United States, however, has resisted the increasing international consensus 
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against the execution of juveniles--those who commit offenses while they are under eighteen years old, 
[FN59] a group for whose exemption the European countries work particularly.  Until the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia, [FN60] the United States also permitted *141 executions 
of mentally retarded offenders.  Much of the legal activity within the European countries has been aimed 
at cases in which juveniles and the mentally impaired are threatened with execution. [FN61]  For that 
reason, European countries will consider Atkins a victory, indicative of the impact their campaign has 
had. [FN62]  While not determinative, the Court did refer to the opinion of the “world community” in its 
opinion, and cited to the European Union’s amicus brief in McCarver. [FN63] 
 
  In their opposition to the death penalty, the European countries also support other regional bodies.  
European parliament resolutions, for example, have urged the United States to follow determinations 
and requests by the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights. [FN64]  However, the Council of 
Europe recently took its most decisive direct diplomatic action in opposing capital punishment in the 
United States and Japan.  It threatened both countries with suspending their observer status if no changes 
toward abolition occur by January 1, 2003. [FN65] 
 
  1. Actions within the United Nations 
 
  In 1994, the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which prohibits “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” [FN66]  
However, the United States entered a reservation to this provision, *142 indicating that it interprets it 
identical to the Due Process Clauses and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. [FN67] 
 
  Eleven European countries objected to this reservation, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which 
evaluates state compliance with the ICCPR, found it incompatible with the Convention. [FN68]  The 
United States, however, did not withdraw it.  On the contrary, legislation was introduced in the U.S. 
Senate that opposed the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s criticism of the United States. [FN69]  The 
European Parliament has implicitly rejected the reservation, and has urged the U.S. Supreme Court to 
force the United States into compliance with the ICCPR. [FN70] 
 
  While international human rights norms have not yet developed a consensus regarding the abolition of 
the death penalty, within the United Nations the European states continue to urge moratoria with the 
ultimate goal of abolition.  Every year the European countries have pressed for a moratorium at the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights. [FN71]  The General Assembly has *143 also seen resolutions on the 
abolition of the death penalty, introduced by the European Union, but has not adopted any yet. [FN72] 
 
  Empowered by its European and Latin American member states, the United Nations committees have 
taken a more forceful stand against the death penalty. Since 1997, the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights has called annually for a moratorium on death sentences. [FN73]  Despite a goal of total 
abolition, the Commission has focused on “[p]rogressively . . . restrict[ing] the number of offences for 
which the death penalty may be imposed.” [FN74]  The initial aims are to stop the execution of pregnant 
women, juvenile offenders, and the mentally ill.  The resolutions also call on non-death states not to 
extradite offenders who are threatened with the death penalty in the receiving state. 
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  2. Supranational Criminal Tribunals 
 
  In the supranational criminal tribunals following World War II, death sentences were imposed on a 
number of offenders. [FN75]  Even though the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials are frequently 
held up as precedent in the development of international criminal law, [FN76] their use of the death 
penalty has not continued in recently established tribunals.  Neither the International Criminal Court for 
Yugoslavia nor the Rwanda Tribunal allow for the imposition of capital punishment. [FN77]  Moreover, 
the newly established *144 International Criminal Court does not provide for death sentences. [FN78]  
For all of these tribunals, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. [FN79] 
 
  In light of the strong preference of the United States for capital punishment, it seems surprising that the 
United States has not attempted to include a death sanction in these international tribunals. [FN80]  
After all, these courts have been designed to deal with the most serious of offenders.  Aware of the 
European and Latin American opposition to capital punishment, the United States has stood virtually 
mute on the punishment provisions in the documents creating these tribunals.  It has avoided direct 
confrontation with its allies by accepting maximum life sentences. [FN81] This could be interpreted as 
acquiescence to the international abolitionist movement, and silent recognition, at least on part of the 
U.S. government, that the death penalty is no longer defensible internationally. 
 
  Advocacy within and through international and regional tribunals is only one aspect of Europe’s 
campaign against the death penalty.  Europe’s anti-capital punishment work has had the most impact in 
areas where it has directly affected U.S. prosecutions and policies. 
 
 
B. The European Court of Human Rights: Extradition 
 
  One of the most celebrated cases in the death penalty arena is the 1989 decision by the European Court 
of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom. [FN82]  This case did not present the Court with a 
direct challenge to the death penalty.  Instead, Soering, a citizen of Germany, claimed that his requested 
extradition from the United Kingdom to the state of Virginia would violate *145 his rights under Article 
3 of the Convention, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, because of the so-
called “death- row phenomenon.”  The Court agreed.  It found that during the extended time period 
between imposition of a death sentence and its execution, which averaged six to eight years in Virginia, 
the condemned person was subjected to severe and increasing anguish and stress, and suffered inhumane 
conditions while being held on death row.  Therefore, Soering could not be extradited to the United 
States as long as he was threatened by the death penalty. [FN83] 
 
  Based on Soering, European states have refused extradition of fugitives to the United States unless they 
get explicit assurances that these individuals will not be subjected to capital trials. [FN84]  Italy and 
Portugal go yet a step further; they refuse extradition to any retentionist country. [FN85] 
 
  The Soering decision did not only have a direct impact on extradition to the United States and other 
retentionist countries.  It also provided other tribunals with a powerful rationale to attack at least the 
circumstances surrounding executions, albeit not capital *146 punishment itself.  The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, for example, cited the Soering decision in its line of cases striking 
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down individual death sentences. [FN86]  Justice Breyer also referred to Soering in two dissents from 
denials of certiorari. [FN87] 
 
  Even though the Soering decision has not affected the jurisprudence of U.S. courts, it has had an 
impact on law-enforcement practices.  Extraditions from European countries can only be expected if the 
state or federal government requesting the extradition provides assurances that it will not seek the death 
penalty. [FN88]  While this policy has been in place for over a decade, it came to the attention of the 
U.S. public in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, when a number of European countries, 
including Spain and France, announced that they would not extradite suspected members of the terrorist 
organization Al-Qaeda unless they received assurances by the U.S. government that it would not ask for 
the death penalty in their trials. [FN89] 
 
  *147 Other forms of international cooperation in criminal and terrorist investigations might also be 
impacted by U.S. requests for the death penalty. Prior to a decision by the U.S. Department of Justice on 
whether to ask for a capital sentence in the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui, a French citizen charged with 
involvement in the attacks of September 11, 2001, the French government asked the United States not to 
demand the death penalty. [FN90]  When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the decision to 
proceed with a death request, the French administration immediately denounced it and declared that it 
would no longer share intelligence information that would assist the federal government in the 
prosecution of Moussaoui. [FN91] The existing cooperation agreement between France and the United 
States allows France to stop the exchange of information in death penalty cases. [FN92] 
 
  In other cases, European countries have attempted to prevent the execution of their citizens directly, 
albeit with little success. 
 
 
C. The International Court of Justice: Consular Notification 
 
  The imposition of the death penalty on foreign citizens has led to the United States being sued in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) twice in the last five years. [FN93]  In both cases, the countries 
representing their citizens--Paraguay and Germany--accused the United States of violating the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, [FN94] under which the United States is obligated *148 to inform 
foreign consuls of arrests and indictments issued against their citizens. [FN95] 
 
  The case brought by Germany involved two German citizens, Walter and Karl LaGrand, who had been 
sentenced to death in Arizona.  The ICJ issued a temporary injunction to prevent the execution of Walter 
LaGrand. [FN96] Germany had requested that the ICJ stay the execution after diplomatic attempts at 
settling the case had failed.  In its intermediate ruling, the ICJ explicitly asked the United States to 
assure that Arizona comply with the United States’ international obligations. [FN97]  Nevertheless, 
Arizona executed Walter LaGrand. [FN98] 
 
  Domestically, the federal government sent mixed messages to the state of Arizona. [FN99]  While the 
federal government opposed a stay at the ICJ, upon the ICJ’s ruling it reluctantly asked the governor to 
postpone the execution.  Most disturbingly, however, it opposed a stay at the Supreme Court level, 
which could have legally bound Arizona not to proceed with the execution. [FN100] 
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  The United States has been frequently criticized for its actions in LaGrand,  [FN101] including by the 
ICJ. [FN102]  Even though this is not *149 the first time that the United States has failed to comply with 
international obligations, [FN103] its action in LaGrand indicates how the federal government is 
inclined to allow individual states that do not seem concerned about international norms [FN104] to 
flout the decisions of a supranational tribunal and violate the international obligations of the United 
States with impunity.  Pro-death penalty attitudes on the federal level and state sovereignty concerns 
ultimately trumped compliance with the consular convention and an ICJ order. [FN105] 
 
  Even though Germany did not style the LaGrand case as an attack on the death penalty, after the World 
Court’s final ruling, in which the Court chastised the United States for its failure to adhere to the Vienna 
Convention, German politicians expressed the hope that the decision would lead the United States to 
reconsider its retentionist stance. [FN106]  Recourse to the ICJ indicates the powerful feelings that the 




*150 III In Search of a Motive 
 
  U.S. politicians and diplomats encounter European objections to the death penalty frequently and in 
numerous fora.  What drives the European agenda? 
 
 
A. Public Pressure 
 
  Since all Western European countries from where the opposition to the death penalty emanates are 
mature democracies, it is conceivable that much of their governmental opposition to the death penalty is 
informed by popular opinion. However, over the years, opinion polls in many European countries 
indicated that their populations continued to support the death penalty even after its abolition. [FN107]  
In recent years, though, the margins have narrowed, and in some countries the majority of the population 
now supports the government’s anti-death penalty stance. [FN108] 
 
  Opposition to the death penalty as carried out in the United States may be connected to this change in 
European public opinion and the wide publicity executions in the United States receive on the other side 
of the Atlantic. European newspapers regularly carry stories about pending executions.  The most 
publicity surrounds executions of individuals who belong to groups perceived as particularly vulnerable, 
such as juveniles, women, and the mentally retarded, as well as European nationals. [FN109] 
 
  Much of the criticism of the death penalty in the United States is connected to other perceived 
inequities in the U.S. criminal justice system. Frequently, racial disparities in the imposition and 
execution of the death penalty are noted.  Not surprisingly, Europeans also focus strongly on the class 
component.  Most death row inmates are poor.  In a recent case involving a Spanish citizen who was 
sentenced to death in Florida but acquitted upon re- trial, the Spanish media vociferously criticized the 
cost of a good defense attorney and the general wealth disparities in the *151 U.S. criminal justice 
system. [FN110]  The case also served as a warning for possible miscarriages of justice. [FN111] 
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  Popular protests that occurred during recent visits of U.S. Presidents to Europe frequently centered 
around the American use of the death penalty. Protesters have objected to its existence generally, and 
particularly to what they perceive as its racially biased application. 
 
  A growing number of powerful anti-death penalty advocacy groups have also developed in Europe.  
Among them are Amnesty International, which is headquartered in London, and the League of Human 
Rights, which operates from Paris. [FN112] 
 
  Advocacy groups have often focused on individual cases which they consider to stand for particular 
perversions of the U.S. criminal justice system and the death penalty.  The case of Mumia Abu-Jamal 
has been among those championed by European human rights activists, who have ultimately gotten the 
European Parliament involved. [FN113] 
 
  As a member of the European Parliament noted, Abu-Jamal “stands out as a symbol” because he is 
black and on death row, because he is an intellectual writer, and because of his militant activism. 
[FN114]  The speaker compared Abu-Jamal to Nelson Mandela and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. [FN115]  
Such a comparison implies that Abu-Jamal’s death sentence is unjust because it is *152 based on racism 
and political opinion rather than factual guilt. [FN116] 
 
  While popular opposition and advocacy groups may be able to exert certain pressure on governments, 
recent diplomatic and legal efforts have been infused with a very powerful missionary fervor on the part 
of many European governments. 
 
 
B. The Death Penalty as a Human Rights Violation 
 
  While the current strategy of Europe’s governments has been to object to the imposition of the death 
sentence in particularly egregious cases and to persuade the United States to join the growing 
international consensus against the imposition of the death penalty against juveniles and the mentally 
retarded, their overall goal is the abolition of the death penalty. [FN117] They have reached the 
conclusion that the death penalty, under any circumstance, violates human rights norms.  Its imposition 
infringes on maturing norms which prevent the government from interfering with the preservation of 
human life.  At the same time, it does not fulfill any penological goals. [FN118] 
 
  Opposition to the U.S. embrace of the death penalty allows European countries to constitute themselves 
as the defenders of human rights.  The European Parliament, for example, characterizes abolition of 
capital punishment as “a fundamental step towards enhancing human dignity, ongoing developing of 
human rights and increasing respect for those rights.” [FN119]  Such a position implies that the United 
States has lost its status as the foremost human rights defender which it perceives itself to be. 
 
  Even though in the past the rationale of individual European governments for abolition may have 
varied dramatically, [FN120] today abolition serves as a rallying cry for the moral superiority of the 
*153 European states. [FN121]  This may also be a reason why European people have become more 
inclined to support abolitionism.  Retention of the death penalty presents a dramatic showcase for 
American backwardness and disregard for human and civil rights. 
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  This does not imply that merely political or strategic considerations motivate European opposition to 
the death penalty. For the European countries, the death penalty symbolizes America’s lack of civility 
and its unilateralism. The United States’ refusal to be bound by international agreements and to adhere 
to decisions by international bodies merely appears to highlight America’s arrogance and its inability to 
work towards a true international consensus in the human rights arena.  Ultimately, European objections 
to the death penalty challenge the United States’ moral leadership of democratic nations and its 
commitment to civil and human rights. 
 
  How can and should the United States react to this development, assuming that it wants to preserve its 
standing in the international human rights arena? [FN122] 
 
  IV Segregation and the Death Penalty: International Costs of Domestic Policies 
 
  The use of the death penalty, in general and especially against groups where a wide international 
consensus has developed against their execution, creates a similar foreign policy embarrassment for the 
United States as segregation did after World War II.  In the early years of the Cold War, publicity about 
the treatment of African Americans in the United States, and in the Southern states in particular, 
severely damaged the United States in its attempts to portray its positions as enlightened, as compared 
with those of the then Soviet Union. [FN123] 
 
  *154 News about the atrocious treatment of African Americans made headlines, not only in communist 
countries, but also in nation-states allied with the United States. [FN124]  Segregation inflicted a heavy 
blow to the image of the United States abroad, in part because the communist nations exploited this 
shortcoming. [FN125]  The U.S. media were aware of this development.  They widely documented the 
impact segregation had on the battle of images conducted during the Cold War. [FN126] 
 
  This impact extended to the United Nations.  During segregation, African Americans regularly brought 
their plight to the attention of the General Assembly.  In this way they could draw international attention 
to the issue. [FN127]  Similarly, today U.S. anti-death penalty organizations and death-row inmates 
bring cases before the U.N. Human Rights Committee. 
 
  Foreign countries also exploit the death penalty issue.  When the U.S. government has attacked their 
human rights records, other countries have frequently retorted by focusing on the U.S. use of capital 
punishment.  Other retentionist countries have been critical of the United States, either because of its 
more expansive use of executions, or because of what they perceive as a double standard. [FN128]  For 
abolitionist countries, the death penalty constitutes a dramatic indication of U.S. violation of human 
rights norms. [FN129] 
 
  Despite these similarities in the international perception and exploitation of segregation and the death 
penalty, there are dramatic differences in the domestic responses.  While the Truman administration 
acknowledged the former as a serious human rights issue, the U.S. government has defended its use of 
the death penalty, in part through relying on strong public support at *155 home and arguing retention to 
be a mandate of popular democracy. [FN130]  During the Cold War, the State Department documented 
the damage that segregation and the treatment of blacks--African Americans as well as foreign 
dignitaries-- inflicted on the standing of the United States abroad. [FN131]  It took it upon itself to 
educate domestic agencies and departments about the impact segregation had on U.S. foreign policy. 
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[FN132]  Moreover, the Truman administration informed the U.S. Supreme Court, through amicus 
briefs, about the negative implications of segregation on the development of U.S. foreign policy. 
[FN133]  Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education [FN134] constituted 
a crucial symbol--at home and abroad--that the United States was committed to racial equality and that 
the U.S. Constitution protected the American dream for all. [FN135] 
 
  Quite the contrary appears to be occurring in the death penalty context.  Foreign critiques of the U.S. 
application of the death penalty are generally disregarded.  On his trip to Europe in June 2001, President 
George W. Bush defended the use of the death penalty as a sovereign choice of the United States, based 
on and supported by public opinion. [FN136]  Attorney General John Ashcroft voiced the same theme in 
his response to French criticism of the Department of Justice’s decision to seek the death penalty in the 
case of Zacharias Moussaoui. [FN137] 
 
  In The Federal Republic of Germany v. The United States, [FN138] the United States went yet a step 
further in its defense of the death penalty. In rejecting Germany’s demand for a stay of execution in the 
case of Walter LaGrand, the Solicitor General argued that consideration of the ICJ’s stay order was 
irrelevant to the legal case before the U.S. Supreme Court. [FN139]  The Supreme Court’s ruling 
denying a preliminary injunction and leave to file a *156 bill of complaint led to the execution of Walter 
LaGrand, and the subsequent rebuke of the United States’ action by the ICJ. [FN140] 
 
  U.S. administrations do not appear to comprehend fully the damage American adherence to the death 
penalty has caused to foreign relations and their standing in the world.  While the executive branch’s 
influence on state governments may be limited in the U.S. federal system, it could exert some persuasive 
power and throw its support behind anti-death penalty positions in select court cases. [FN141]  Had it 
chosen to support Germany’s demand for a stay of execution, for example, it would have merely 
vindicated rights under the Vienna Convention rather than espoused an abolitionist argument.  However, 
at this point, the federal government has not attempted to persuade the courts to narrow their position on 
the death penalty in light of foreign policy and international human rights concerns. 
 
  In a number of death penalty cases involving the execution of mentally retarded individuals and 
juveniles, former diplomats filed amicus briefs, indicating the problems such executions cause for the 
development of U.S. foreign policy.  They noted that “[i]n diplomatic settings, the United States faces 
daily and growing criticism from the international community for maintaining a cruel and uncivilized 
practice.” [FN142]  They urged the Supreme Court not only to consider the growing international 
consensus against such practices, but also their practical ramifications.  The amici argued that continuing 
the execution of mentally retarded individuals “would strain diplomatic relations with close American 
allies, increasing America’s diplomatic isolation and impairing other United States foreign policy 
interests.” [FN143]  Despite their focus on the execution of the mentally retarded, all executions make 
the conduct of foreign policy, at least in Europe, difficult. [FN144] 
 
 
*157 V The Death Penalty in the “War on Terrorism” 
 
  While there are substantial differences between the fight against segregation and attempts to abolish the 
death penalty, the United States’ use of capital punishment has become the symbol of a battle of images 
that centers around human rights.  European criticism of the death penalty is closely tied to a larger 
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critique of other aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system, usually centering around the race and class 
of criminal defendants [FN145] and the overall harshness of the existing punishment regime, which is 
exemplified by chain gangs, life without parole, and three-strikes laws. [FN146]  Anti- death penalty 
advocacy from abroad is often intimately connected with a larger social justice critique that frequently 
centers around disparities in American society. [FN147]  Ultimately, the question of whether the United 
States can be a legitimate protector of and advocate for human rights abroad when it fails to protect them 
at home becomes distilled to the issue of whether a “civilized” country can employ the death penalty in 
its criminal justice system. [FN148] 
 
  As the “War on Terrorism” is a global struggle, despite its military might, the United States will have 
to rely on the cooperation of its allies, including European countries. [FN149]  If this “war” takes *158 
on the same importance and apocalyptic terms as the Cold War, domestic policies that constitute barriers 
against more effective international cooperation may have to be scrutinized more carefully, as occurred 
during the Cold War. [FN150] Depending on the ramifications of its decision to seek death sentences for 
Zacharias Moussaoui and possibly others involved in the attacks of September 11, the United States may 
have to consider seriously the special sensibilities of its European allies in the prosecution of their 
citizens. [FN151]  So far, however, the United States seems engaged in attempting to circumvent the 
European restrictions on cooperation in cases where death sentences are threatened. [FN152]  
Ultimately, however, failure of such attempts might lead to a more restricted use of the death penalty, 
and possibly even motions towards abolition. [FN153]  After all, European cooperation in terrorism 
*159 prosecutions may be more crucial than the imposition of death sentences on individual defendants. 
 
  Many Europeans consider the United States’ use of the death penalty symbolic of its disregard of 
international norms and an utter lack of concern for the interests and sensibilities of its allies. [FN154]  
Therefore, gradual abolitionism may symbolize more than merely a retreat from capital punishment as a 
sanction.  It would reassert American (co-)leadership in the human rights arena and allow the United 
States to reassert itself as an international player, rather than a unilateral power. [FN155]  Therefore, the 
importance of the death penalty extends far beyond its domestic meaning, and Europe’s fight against it 
symbolizes a larger schism in the relationship between the Europeans and the United States. 
 
 
[FNa1]. Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Professor of Law, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law.  Bates College, B.A., 1989; Yale Law School, J.D., 1992; Georgetown 
University Law Center, LL.M., 1994.  I would like to thank Eric Freedman, Stephen Mathias, Andreas 
Paulus, Jeff Pokorak, Michael Smith, and Peter Spiro for their valuable input and suggestions. My 
gratitude goes to the Morse Center at the University of Oregon School of Law for putting on the death 
penalty symposium and to Barbara Aldave.  I owe special thanks for excellent research assistance to 
Patricia Kasting and my research assistant Antonetta Stancu (Hofstra 2003). 
 
[FN1]. See, e.g., Lionel Barber, America’s War, Fin. Times, Sept. 14, 2001, at 22. 
 
[FN2]. See, e.g., E.U. to Seek Global Extradition Agreement with U.S., Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 
15, 2002; Elizabeth Bryant, Council of Europe Faults Terror Treatment, United Press Int’l, Jan. 24, 
2002. 
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[FN3]. See, e.g., Joel Blocker, France/U.S.: Criticism Tempered On Decision to Seek Death Penalty for 
Moussaoui, Middle East News Online (Apr. 2, 2002), at 
http://www.middleeastwire.com:8080/storypage.jsp?id=2457. 
 
[FN4]. For an example of intervention by the European Union in a specific case, see Letter of the 
European Union to Roy Barnes, the Governor of Georgia, on behalf of Tracy Housel, at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/HouselGAGovLett.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) 
[hereinafter Letter of the European Union]. 
 
[FN5]. William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law 4-5 (2d ed. 1997). 
 
[FN6]. See, e.g., id. at 5-6. 
 
[FN7]. Portugal, for example, abolished the death penalty in 1867.  Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon 
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda 9 (1986).  It was followed by the Netherlands 
three years later.  Schabas, supra note 5, at 6. 
 
[FN8]. Peter Hodgkinson, The United Kingdom and the European Union, in Capital Punishment: Global 
Issues and Prospects 193, 204-06 (Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996). 
 
[FN9]. Schabas, supra note 5, at 19. 
 
[FN10]. See, e.g., Christopher Hollis, The Homicide Act 9-10, 33  (1964) (describing decrease in 
number of death eligible offenses and ultimate classification of homicides into those leading to death 
and those allowing only for imprisonment); Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on 
Executions, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 845, 845 (2001) (describing the situation in England). 
 
[FN11]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 10. 
 
[FN12]. Schabas, supra note 5, at 6. 
 
[FN13]. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 609-10  (1992) (recounting the 
executions of those convicted in Nuremberg); William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 733, 737-40 (1997) [hereinafter War Crimes]. 
 
[FN14]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 9, 12. 
 
[FN15]. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 102 (F.R.G.), English translation available at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm. 
 
[FN16]. Hodgkinson, supra note 8, at 195, 205 (last executions in England occurred in 1964). 
 
[FN17]. For some polling data from the 1990s, see id. at 8, at 196-97  (England), 204 (France), 205 
(Denmark), 206 (Spain and Sweden).  While in a few countries--England and France--popular support 
for the death penalty continues to be strong, in others--Denmark and Sweden--it has largely abated. 
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[FN18]. Id. at 205-06 (support for death penalty virtually non-existent among church bodies and the 
legal and medical professions).  For a critique of elite policy-making in this context, see John McAdams, 
It’s Good, and We’re Going to Keep It: A Response to Ronald Tabak, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 819, 821-22 
(2001). 
 
[FN19]. Polling data in this area appears unreliable or at least subject to relatively quick change.  See, 
e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 8, at 205-06 (providing data for Denmark and Sweden, with Spain’s 
popular opinion equally divided); Thomas Sancton, A Matter of Life or Death, Time Atlantic, May 21, 
2001, at 28 (indicating sixty percent disapproval rate for the death penalty in France and Italy). 
 
[FN20]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 28. 
 
[FN21]. Tom Wicker, Foreword, in Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at ix, x. 
 
[FN22]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 29 tbl.2.1, at 29 (giving chronology of abolition in the 
United States). 
 
[FN23]. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement 
in the United States, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (2002). 
 
[FN24]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 30-33. 
 
[FN25]. Id. at 26, 30 tbl.2.2. 
 
[FN26]. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Furman rejected the state punishment regimes in place because of the 
extraordinary discretion they allowed juries which caused arbitrary decisions.  It did not declare death 
sentences per se unconstitutional. 
 
[FN27]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 37 (quoting U.S. commentators on the Furman decision); 
Kirchmeier, supra note 23, at 15. 
 
[FN28]. Numerous domestic anti-death penalty advocates continue to advocate for a moratorium on the 
death penalty; others have argued that a moratorium will ultimately prolong the existence of capital 
punishment.  See, e.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 23, at 75-76 (judicially imposed moratorium almost 
destroyed the anti-death penalty movement in the 1970s), 78, 103-06 (narrow focus on innocent death 
row inmates may lead only to narrow procedural changes rather than abolition); Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, Doc. 
9115, at para. 36 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Parliamentary Assembly Report], available at 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc01/EDOC9115.htm. 
 
[FN29]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 38-41. 
 
[FN30]. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 
[FN31]. In the last twenty-five years the death row population has grown steadily, to reach a high of 
3711 in 2001.  Summary of State Lists of Prisoners on Death Row, Death Row U.S.A. at 25 (Winter 
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2002), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002); see 
also James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2065 tbl.4 (2000). 
 
[FN32]. New York, for example, reinstituted the death penalty in 1995. See Kirchmeier, supra note 23, 
at 20. 
 
[FN33]. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §  60002(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82  (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § §  
3591-99 (1994)); see generally Rory K. Little, Foreword: The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some 
Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347 (1999). 
 
[FN34]. See, e.g., Cecile S. Holmes, Christianity’s Ties to Penal System Explored, The Times-Picayune, 
July 7, 2001, at 14.  McVeigh’s execution was followed closely by that of Juan Garza, a convicted drug 
trafficker. 
 
[FN35]. As of January 1, 2002, 24 individuals were on federal death row, as compared to 3680 in the 
states.  See Summary of State Lists of Prisoners on Death Row, supra note 31. 
 
[FN36]. See id. 
 
[FN37]. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Mexican Killer Is Refused Clemency by Oklahoma, N.Y. Times, 
July 21, 2001, at A8 (as of July 2001, ninety-seven non- U.S. citizens were on death row in seventeen 
states; they hailed from thirty- four different countries, though approximately half of them were 
Mexican citizens). 
 
[FN38]. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German 
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 753, 767 (2000). 
 
[FN39]. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 
[FN40]. Id., art.2(1). 
 
[FN41]. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force March 1, 1985), available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/couneurproto6.htm [hereinafter Protocol No. 6]. 
 
[FN42]. Id., art. 2.  See also Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the 
Death Penalty, art. 2 (adopted June 8, 1990), at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/oasdeath.htm. 
 
[FN43]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 21. 
 
[FN44]. Leena Kurki, International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment, in Sentencing and 
Sanctions in Western Countries 331, 347 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).  Membership 
in the Council of Europe is a prerequisite for admission to the European Union. 
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[FN45]. The Protocol is in effect in thirty-five Council of Europe member- states, and has been signed 
by four others.  Id. Only Turkey has not yet taken any action on it.  Chris Patten, Intervention at the 
Council of Europe, June 21, 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/pattern/sp01_300.htm. 
 
[FN46]. For a detailed listing of the legal situation in all Council of Europe member states and observer 
states, see Council of Europe, Death Is Not Justice: The Council of Europe and the Death Penalty 26-42 
(Oct. 2001), at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/dp/pdfs/deathpen.pdf. 
 
[FN47]. See, e.g., Kurd Leader Wins Appeal Right, United Press Int’l, Dec. 15, 2000. 
 
[FN48]. See, e.g., Ayla Ganioglu, Poll Expectation Obstructs Lifting of Death Penalty, Turkish Daily 
News (Apr. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/0_4_01_02/dom.htm#d5; Ilana Navaro, Breaking 
Turkish Taboos, The Jerusalem Report, May 8, 2000, at 34.  
  Compare Turkey’s reaction to European pressure with the response of the state of Arizona in the 
LaGrand case, infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN49]. Turkey has long aspired to membership in the European Union, and has been warned that an 
execution would put these plans on hold indefinitely.  The European Union has been accused of 
imposing its vision of human rights on countries where it can exert power but does not do so in 
situations where its economic strength is insufficient. Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, Human Rights in the 
European Union: Internal Versus External Objectives, 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 363, 378 (2001).  
  See also David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally (2001) (draft on 
file with the author) (outlining the anti- death penalty pressure Western European countries have exerted 
on Eastern European countries planning to join the Council of Europe, and ultimately the European 
Union). 
 
[FN50]. Council of Europe, Ministers’ Deputies, Decisions CM/Del/Dec(2002)784, 784th meeting (Feb. 
21, 2002), at 4.5 & App. 9, at http://cm.coe.int/stat/E/Decisions/2002/784/d04_5.  Protocol No. 13 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of 
the death penalty in all circumstances, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/187.htm.  
The Protocol was opened for ratification on May 3, 2002.  It does not allow any derogations or 
reservations. 
 
[FN51]. Despite a moratorium on death sentences, Russia has still not fulfilled its obligation toward the 
Council of Europe of banning the death penalty altogether and signing the Sixth Protocol.  Russian 
Parliament Will Refuse to Abolish Death Penalty: Deputy, Agence France Press, Feb. 8, 2002. 
 
[FN52]. Toni M. Fine, Moratorium 2000: An International Dialogue Toward a Ban on Capital 
Punishment, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 421, 427-28 (1999) (“The Italian government has been the 
driving force behind the recent international abolitionist movement”). 
 
[FN53]. European diplomatic efforts have created difficulties for U.S. diplomats in their conduct of 
foreign policy.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) 
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(No. 00-8727), available at 2001 WL 648607 [hereinafter Diplomats’ Brief]; infra notes 142- 44 and 
accompanying text.  
  In addition to legal and diplomatic measures, European countries have also suggested an economic 
boycott of goods manufactured in states that continue to employ capital punishment.  Fine, supra note 
52, at 428; Peter O. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, 79(6) Foreign Affairs 9, 14 (Nov./Dec. 2000).  For a 
discussion of the increasing importance of subnational governments within the international human 
rights regime, see Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 567, 
583-87 (1997) [hereinafter The States and International Human Rights]. 
 
[FN54]. See, e.g., EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Excerpts from the Memorandum by the European 
Union at the 54th United Nations General Assembly, at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/54thUNexcrpt.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (detailing 
various EU interventions in death cases around the globe).  The European Union has developed 
guidelines how to approach the imposition of the death penalty in third countries.  The Council of the 
European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, June 3, 1998, 
at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) 
[hereinafter EU Guidelines]. 
 
[FN55]. The Death Penalty: Europe v. America, World View Commentary No. 87, Nov. 16, 2000, at 
http://www.law.nwu.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/hrcomments/2000/Nov16_00.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). 
 
[FN56]. For some examples of this strategy, see Patten, supra note 45. 
 
[FN57]. See Kurki, supra note 44, at 349.  The time frame during which a woman should not be 
executed after giving birth varies dramatically.  A number of countries seem to extend it to two years--
the length of time the World Health Organization suggests that women nurse their children. 
 
[FN58]. While the intentional and unjustified taking of human life is generally considered the most 
serious offense, there is disagreement as to what other types of crimes might fit into this category.  In 
addition, a substantial number of states violate this prohibition by imposing the death penalty for drug 
trafficking or adultery.  See, e.g., Kurki, supra note 44, at 348. 
 
[FN59]. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (imposition of death penalty on people 
who were under sixteen when crime was committed violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), with 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (imposition of capital punishment on sixteen- and seventeen- 
year-old offenders constitutionally permissible).  
  Eighty-three of eighty-nine retentionist countries respect this prohibition.  Among the remaining six, 
during the 1990s the United States executed the largest number of individuals who committed offenses 
while under eighteen. Kurki, supra note 44, at 348. 
 
[FN60]. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).  In oral argument, the Court raised the question whether the Europeans’ 
position on the execution of the mentally retarded should be relevant in the Court’s decision making.  
Oral Arguments, Atkins v. Virginia, 2002 WL 341765 (U.S. 2002).  For other death cases in which the 
Supreme Court looked outside U.S. borders to determine international norms, see, e.g., Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830- 31 (1988). 
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[FN61]. See, e.g., Letter of the European Union, supra note 4; EU Guidelines, supra note 54. 
 
[FN62]. The decision, however, indicates that the Europeans may not have to expect much support from 
the Supreme Court in their efforts to protect juveniles from the imposition of the death penalty.  See 
Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.18. 
 
[FN63]. Id. at 2249 n.21.  In his dissenting opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist considers the Court’s 
reference to international opinion and foreign laws flawed as he “fail[s] to see... how the views of other 
countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate 
determination.”  Id. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 
[FN64]. European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States, B5-
0341, 0354, 0359, 0370 and 0376/00 (Apr. 13, 2000), at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/epres041300.htm. 
 
[FN65]. Council of Europe, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, 
Resolution 1253 (2001), at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/eres1253.htm (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2002); see also Parliamentary Assembly Report, supra note 28.  US Warned on Death 
Penalty, Fin. Times, June 27, 2001, at 1; Council of Europe to Urge Japan, U.S. to Stop Death Penalty, 
Japan Econ. Newswire, June 25, 2001. 
 
[FN66]. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 7. 
 
[FN67]. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).  This reservation was taken to 
prevent Article 7 from being interpreted as outlawing the death penalty or declaring the circumstances 
surrounding capital punishment to be a violation of international law. This so-called Soering reservation 
refers to the decision by the European Court of Human Rights, which interpreted the identical provision 
in the European Convention on Human Rights to be violated by the so-called “death row phenomenon.”  
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.  See S. Exec. Rpt. No. 102-23 at 12 (1992); William A. 
Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United 
States Still a Party?, 21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 277, 282 (1995) [hereinafter Invalid Reservations].  
  The United States also entered a reservation to Article 6, in which it reserved the right to execute those 
who commit crimes while below the age of eighteen. 
 
[FN68]. Kurki, supra note 44, at 335; Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 67, at 310, 315 (Human 
Rights Committee held US reservations under articles 6 and 7 invalid); EU Demarche on the Death 
Penalty, Feb. 25, 2000, at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Demarche.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2002). 
 
[FN69]. Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 67, at 325 n.246. 
 
[FN70]. European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United States, B5-0613, 0619, 
0624, 0631 and 0638/2000 at P 5 (June 7, 2000), at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/EPRes070600.htm. 
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[FN71]. See, e.g., U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session, Resolution on the Death Penalty, 
Sponsored by the European Union, Apr. 27, 2000, E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/UN56Res2000.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).  
  Various sub-groups within the United Nations have criticized the United States for its imposition of the 
death penalty.  See, e.g., Kurki, supra note 44, at 349 (discussing critique of U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions of U.S. use of death penalty against juvenile 
offenders).  An exhaustive discussion of non-European criticism of the death penalty, including that 
occurring in international fora, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
[FN72]. Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Sixth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 95 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 213, 214 (2001); see also EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Excerpts from a Statement Delivered 
to the European Parliament by EU External Relations Commissioner the Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, 
Feb. 16, 2000, at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Patten.htm (explaining why EU froze 
its death penalty resolution introduced at the General Assembly). 
 
[FN73]. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests--Capital 
Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1369, 1377-78 (2000).  The United States has opposed 
the text every year by relying on arguments of national self-determination.  Dennis, supra note 72, at 
214.  See also Radelet, supra note 10, at 847. 
 
[FN74]. Question of the Death Penalty, Res. 1999/61, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 56th Session, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61. 
 
[FN75]. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 13, at 598. 
 
[FN76]. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 95 (1999); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The 
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 302, 309 (1999). 
 
[FN77]. While domestic courts in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia abolished capital sanctions 
during the 1990s, the national courts of Rwanda have assessed the death penalty in a number of cases 
arising from the Hutu massacres in the early 1990s.  This discrepancy in sentences has caused serious 
concern since the goal of the international tribunal has been to try the most serious offenders.  Schabas, 
War Crimes, supra note 13, at 763 (citing statement of Rwanda’s representative before the Security 
Council). 
 
[FN78]. The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court was adopted by the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 
July 17, 1998.  U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) art. 77. 
 
[FN79]. See, e.g., id. at art. 77(1)(b). 
 
[FN80]. Despite its defense of the death penalty at home, the United States has not crusaded for its 
greater adoption abroad.  This contrasts with its attempts to export other features of the U.S. criminal 
justice system, such as the jury. 
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[FN81]. Schabas, War Crimes, supra note 13, 770 (recounting the debates surrounding the punishment 
provisions in the statute for the International Criminal Court and evaluating the position of the United 
States). 
 
[FN82]. No. 161, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989). 
 
[FN83]. Federal courts have rejected similar arguments on the death-row phenomenon.  See, e.g., Ceja 
v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 1998); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996).  But see 
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Deeds, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 15443 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1074 
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Interview with D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United States 
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[FN123]. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61, 62 (1988).  
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abolitionist countries.  However, if any foreign critique is accepted domestically, theirs is likely to be 
credited more. 
 
[FN129]. It has been argued that the United States’ surprising loss of its seat in the U.N. Human Rights 
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